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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

AUSTIN RICE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
ER1IA RICE, Executrix and Trustee, In
the matter of the Estate of David L.
Rice, Deceased,
Defendarnt wnd Respondent.

Case No.
7268

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the matter of the estate of David L. Rice, deeeased, a decree of distribution was entered on December
26, 1945. By said decree, Austin Rice, appellant, was
awarded as his full distributive share of his father's
estate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''Approximately 27 acres in Section 31, Township 3 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
now occupied hy him.''
Due notice of the hearing of the p·etition for distribution
was given, and no appeal was taken from said decree.
In October, 1946, this action was commenced to
amend said decree on the ground, as stated in appellant's
amended petition, that fraud had been practiced on the
court and on ~ppellant :
(a) By failure of respondent to set up in her petition that the ''approximately 27 acres'' above referred to
included two tracts of land located east of the highway
running betwee'n Centerville and Farmington, aggregating 3.85 acres ;
(b) By her failure to represent to the court that
the land awarded to appellant was en'titled to ten hours
per w·eek water right from Davis Cre,ek as appurtenant
to ap~pellant 's land and by failing to have said water
right included in the decree.
(c) By repiresenting to appellant and his wife at
Farmington court house on the day the petition for distribution was heard:
"That it would he unnecessary and a waste
of time for them to attend said hearing or to be
·present thereat, and that they did not need to do
so, because she had taken care of everything for
them, and that they would get the farm they then
occupied as provided in the wiN.'' ·
And that relying on said statemen-ts, appeUant did
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not attend said hearing and did not have his day in
court.
Respondent's general demurrer to said a~nended
petition was sustained, and this court reversed said decision on the ground that said amended petition contained allegations of "·extrinsic fraud" \Y hich, if proved,
would entitle petitioner to relief.
The case \Yas tried, and the trial court found that
r·espondent was not guilty of the fraudulent misrepresentations alleged, or any fraud whatsoever, intrinsic
or extrinsic, and that respondent did not make any statement or do any act to prevent appellant from attending
said hearing or having his day in court. See Findings
11 and 14, Rec. 125, 126. However, the court found that
David L. Rice:
''After about the year 1919 did not use any
water during his thirty-two-hour turn through the
White Ditch, which extends south from Davis
Creek and is the only ditch through which the
said 27 acre tract could be supplied with water,
but the court finds that after said Austin Rice
took up his residence on the 27 acre tract in the
Fall of 19~37, at times during the freshet season,
and occasionally when the water was on turns, he
used some water through the White Ditch, presumably with his father's permission, for the irrigation of approximately 8 acres of orchard and
garden, a part of the said 27 acre/ tract." (Finding 8, par. 8, Rec. 124).
And the court also found:
''That at the time of the death of the said
David/ Ij· Rice, there was appurtenant to all the
irrigated land of his estate referred to in the eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dence, the thirty-two hours of water right hereinbefore mentioned. That said David L. Rice did
not use, and there was never appurtenant to said
27 acre tract, a ten hour use of Davis Creek each
week, but the court finds that by reason of the
facts found in rpla11agraph 8 hereof, the proportion
of said thirty-two hour p·eriod which is appurtenant to said 8 acres of the Austin Rice farm was,
and is four hours, that is to say, from one o'clock
A.M. until five o'clock A.M. Thursday morning of
each week, which is the only water right from
Davis Creek to which plaintiff is entitled.'' (Finding 9, Rec. 124).
The court held that the 27.71 described in the
decree is the only lnnd to which appellant is entitled under the will. (Finding 8, Rec. 12'3.).
Both parties appeal.
ARGUMENT
Counsel for ap·pellant sets forth in his brief a summary of all testimony which he regards as favorable to
himself and injects into the recital many unjustifiable
interpretations, which we shall not take time to refute.
The greater p'art of his hrief is devoted to a statement
and argument with respect to what he considers to he inequities in the will of David L. Rice; to a discussion of
what he claims was the use· made of wate-r from Davis
Creek on the Austin Rice tract and the use claimed to
have been made hy Austin Rice of tl1e 3.85 acres east of
the highway. Couns·el has not only drawn one herring,
but an entire case of herring, ancient and odorous, across
the true trail of this law suit by ·the most p~rolix and
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tedious assertions as to the integrity and truthfulness
of his (H\rn "itnesses and the unworthiness and unreliability of each and every -witness for respondent, hut
he artfully and studiously avoids a discussion of the real
questions ''Thich it is the duty of the court to determine
on this appeal.

THE \\TATER RIGHT
\\r e refuse to be led into a discussion of a!ll the de-

tails of the evidence which reveal the disputes between
appellant's witnesses and those of the appellee, further
than to show that the overwhehning weight of the evidence is to the effect that after the year 1919 (that is,
for more than twenty-five years prior to his death),
David L. Rice never attempted to make any use of the
waters of Davis Creek through the White Ditch any
time when the water was on turns, and that the only use
of water ever 1nade on said property was during the
freshet 3eason.

Rawl Rice, forty-eight years of age, son of-David L.
Riee, irrigated the Rice farms from his early boyhood up
to 1929, ·exce}l't for 1917 and 1918 when he was in the
army. He was familiar with the ditch leading north from
Davis Creek to his father's orchard and farm lands,
and with the ditch taken out lower down on Davis Creek
which alS"o runs north and under the highway to the'
Clover field, and he irrigated these orchard and farm
lands every year (Tr. 107-8). He was also familiar
\vith the White Ditch leading south from Davis Creek
to\Val'd the Austin Rice tract, and testified that said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tract was not irrigated from said ditch ( Tr. 109, 113) ;
that the Austin Ri:ce traet was wet and swampy, and that
he constructed drains on said tract (Tr. 109-110), from
which drains said tract was irrigated ( Tr. 112, 113, 125) ;
and that all water from Davis Creek used by his father
during the thirty-two hour ·period each week allotted
to his father was diverted from said Cre·ek through the
ditches that ran north to the orchard and farm lands
and to the Glover field ( Tr. 114-115).
J•ames 8. Rice, forty-one, another son of David L.
Rice, was familiar with his father's farms and the irrigation thereof up to 1939 ( Tr. 130). He testified that
ther·e were approximately sixty or seventy-five acres of
orchard or other lands below the north ditches (Tr.
131) ; that he assisted in irrigating each year, and that
during his father's thirty-two hour turn, the water was
taken out of the two north ditches (Tr. 132), and that
no water was taken through the White Ditch to irrigate
th·e Austin Rice truct ( Tr. 133) ; that the White Ditch
was not -cemented un·til 1934, and after that date, as well
as before, that tract was irrigated from drains (Tr. 134)
and in no other way (Tr. 136).
Le.Gratro~e Rice, forty-four, another son of David
L. Rice, worked on his father's farms each year until
1945, the ye1ar of his father's death· Exhibit 1 shows
the Rice lauds, and L.eGrand tes·tified that during the
thirty-two hour period, he took the water through the
north ditches and irrigated a total of about eighty-·eight
acres (Tr. 154, 155), and that up to 1945, no water but
drain water was used on the Austin Rice tract ('Tr. 157).
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1. . oung Rau·l Rice, twenty-nine, a grandson of David
L. Rice, \vorked on the place until he was twenty years
of age (Tr. 189, 190); never knew of any water being
used through the White Ditch to irrigate the Austin
Rice
tract ' and that said tract was irrigated from drains
.
(Tr. 190).
All of these witnesses are corroborated by Roy
Whz~te, \vho lives a quarter of a mile north of the Austin
Rice property. White lmew \vho used the water through
the White Ditch each year (Tr. 198); knew tl?-at David
L. Rice took water through this ditch during the freshet
season up to about 1919 (Tr. 199) ·when the ditch was
\vashed out, at which time after vainly endeavoring to
get the water through the ditch, he said to 'Vhite: ''You
take the water, I give up," and White s'ays that David
L. Rice abandoned the idea of getting water down that
ditch (Tr. 200-201).

T"al GZover, familiar with the use of water through
the White Ditch. He lives one block south of the Austin
Rice land, knew that land to be swampy and boggy (Tr.
214); knew of water from the White Ditch being used
there t\venty-five years ago "during the flush P'art of
the season" (Tr. 216), but since that time never saw
the land irrigated except from drains (Tr. 218).
Clyde Wiloox, fifty-eight, was fami liar with the
use of the White Ditch all his lif.e except during the ten
year~ from 1914 to 1924. He never kn·ew of David L·
Rice using water on the Austin Rice tract prior to 1914
or after 19·24 ( ~rr. 228-229). He saw David L., RawI and
1
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LeGrand water the Austin Rice place from drains (Tr.
229).
This evidence prepondera;tes against the testimony
of Austin Rice and his wife. The latter, of course, could
testify only as to the period subsequent to 1937 when they
took possession of the tract in quesition. She testified
that from 1935. to 1940, her children incTeased in numbers from 'three to nine (Tr. 51); and that in 1948, she
had eleven, all of whom she personally cared for without help ('Tr. 56); yet she stated that she was with her
husband and assisted in irrigating his place from nine
o'clock Wednesday evening to seven o'clock Thursday
morning (ten rhours) every week, every year after 1937
(Tr. 53, 54). Is i't possible to believe such statements?
The only other witnesses for appellant were :
Irvin Hughes, forty-eight, who stated that so far as
he knew, Austin used the water of Davis Creek only
during ''the last few years sin0e he has been living on
the p·roperty," (Tr. 269) but on cross-examination, he
stated that he had never seen water diverted from the
White Ditch to the Austin Rice land (Tr. 271) except a
long time ago when he was a boy (Tr. 272).
Davrid R. L·und, wh o testified that he last saw David
L. Rice irrigate the Austin Rice land from Davis Creek
from 1908 to 1915 (Tr. 281) and in 19·2'1-23 during the
freshet season (Tr· 284) and knew nothing about the
use of the water after 1923 (Tr. 285).
McQuis-ton, who manifested a great anxiety to sup~
port the plaintiff's claims, knew nothing about the Austin
Rice place except during 'th·e last four or five years, and
1
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he testified that Austin used the water ·through the
'Vhite Ditch not only during the night time, but in the
mornings and afternoons as well (Tr. 292-293).
Clearly the great \veight of the evidence is against
the contention that Austin Rice is entitle~d to ten hours
-of water per \veek, .and there is no ~evidence whatsoever
that he teas, or is enti.tled to four hours ,as fownd by the
court. There is not a scintilla of proof that D:avid L.
R-ice et~ er _allotted the particular ten hours, orr any "ben
hours, or any four hours, ~or any hours, bo the Austin
Rice property, ~or that he ever reguZarly, o.r ~at ~all, irrigated that tract during the ten hours cZaimed, or an;y
ten or any four hours, ·or at ;all, except drurling the frreshe:t
season priorr to 1919. W:hy would he devote one-third
of his water right to the irrigation of eight or nine acres
(al'l the land in the Austin Rice tra~t that Mrs. Rice (Tr.
57) or Austin (Tr. 75) claims was in need of irrigation)
through a ditch which would not hold water until after
it was cemented in 193~ (Tr. 200-2:11), when he had up·wards of seventy acres of orchard and other lands, which
the testimony shows cannot he p·rofitahly used without
the entire thirty-two hours~ (Tr. 160, 191)
1

THE 3.85 ACRES
The dispute in the evidence so far as concerns Austin's use of the 3.85 acres on the east side of the highway
is just as 1narked, and we sha;ll not take time or space to
discuss in detail the testimony on that question. S·uffiee it to say that the trial court found that the weight
of the evidence was against ap~pellant's contention. FurSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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thermore, whether water was used on the Austin Rice
tract, or whether he used the barn and corral property,
or whether the value of what was devised to him by his
father was more or less than other heirs will eventually
receive, (a point made mueh of by appellant) or whether
Erma Rice in presenting her petition for final distributi'on was under obligation to represent to the court what
she did not helieve to be the fact, to- wit, that the Austin
Rice tract was entitled to ten hours of water from Davis
Creek, is all hesi'de the real question for determination
on this appeal.

NECES:SlARY TO SHOW EXTRINSIC FRAUD
Will the court please bear in mind that the deeree
of distribution was entered on December 26, 1945, and
that there was no ap·peal from said decree, and that this
is an action in equity to amend said decree on the g~ro'UIIU],
that the s1ame was p~nocu.red by frood. To appeUant's
amended complaint, respondent demurred generally, and
on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The general demurrer was sustained, and appellant appealed and defendant assigned cross-error hecause the court overruled
her demurrer to the jurisdiction. This court held that
the trial court was right in overruling the demurrer for
lack of jurisdiction, but held that there was error in sustaining respondent's general demurrer·
Referring to the amended complaint, this court declared:
''Being lirmited ~o his ·rel~ef in .equity, has the
petitioner stated facts in his p·etition sufficient
to constitute a cause of action against the execu-
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trix and trustee? To do so, he must allege facts
to sho"~ fraudulent acts or conduct on the part
of the executrix sufficient to establish 'extrimsic
frau.d'.'' (Italics ours).
The court then quotes from the authorities 'vhich
announce the principle underlying such an artion, as follo\\Ts:
'· 'In all these cases and many others which
have been examined, relief has been granted on
the ground that by some fraud practiced directly
upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, that party has been prevented
from :presenting all of his case to the court'.''
This court then remarks:
''Equity will relieve one seeking relief from
the effect of a judgment or decree pTocured by
conduct of the successful party which prevents
the injured party from appearing at the hearing
or trial on the merits. Under the present state
of the record, this court must assume the e~ecu
trix knowingly and wilfully made misrepresentations to the petitioner which prevented him from
appearing ~at the he~aring and ob"baimilng the prope'f'ty that he cZaims should have be,en his. Predicated on these alleged fraudulent acts, petitioner
was denied his day in court.'' (Italics ours).
Later in the opinion, the court declares:
''Judged by the allegations of the p~etition in
this action, petitioner has been deceived to his
prejudice, and a grave injustice would he perpetrated if petitioner could esbablish the alleged
facts, yet was denied the opportunity of proving
them.'' (Italics ours).
In re R.ice 's Estate -------- Ut~h -------- 182 Pac. ( 2)
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111, 117-118. The court then holds that the trial court
erred in sustaining the general demurrer and that as the
trial court did not state the reasons for his ruling, the
plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend his
petition if he so desired. No subsequent amendment to
the petition was filed, except one relating to the actual
area or quantity of land lying wes't of the highway, that
is to say: by an amendment, petitioner claims that by
reason of the railroad rights of way there are only
twenty-five acres instead of appr-oximately 27.71 acres,
which the decree purports to award to plaintiff, but as
to the fraud,claimed, the only allegations are those which
were before this court on the former appeal. Now
what are those allegations of extrinsic fraud~
''That on the day set for the hearing of the
petition of Erma Rice, executrix, for the approval
of her final account and for decree of distribution
herein, petitioner and his wife went to the court
house at Farmington, Davis County, Utah, to attend the; session of the above entitled court that
was to hear said petition of said Erma Rice, executrix, at said time and place, and that thereupon,
.and 1p1rior to said he,aring of s,a,id pe t'ition, on the
same ~ay and in the hallw'aty .outside the cowrt
room in said oourt house, the s:ai.d Erma Rice n~et
your petit~oner and his wife and, advised them
that it W0Uld be wnneoessary rand Ia Wlast~e of time
for them to attrt.end the he:artifng or to be present
there1a:t, arnd that they did not need to do so beO(JJUse she had taken oare of everythilng for them,
and that they w:ould get the farm they t'hen occupied ,as provided forr im s~aid will; that relying
upon said representations of the said Erma Rice,
all of which were untrue and then known to her to
1

1

1
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be untrue, yo11Jr petitioner did no~t ,(J)tltend the
hearitng of said peti~on of Erma Rice, execu,trix,
and did not kno"~ until shortly before the filing
of this petition that said Erina Rire had not accurately represented to the court the proper description of the farn1 occ,upied by your petitioner,
and did not kno'v until shortly before the filing
of this p~etition that the water used on and appurtenant to the farm \Yas not included in the
cleeree of distribution, and did not know that the
rep·resentations of the said Erma Rice that she
had properly taken care of his rights and interests
were false and untrue·" (Rec. 78).
Please bear in mind this is the only. allegation of
e:1·trinsic fraud, if such it can be termed, in the entire
petition. There is not one scintilla of evidence in sup~
port of this allegation. It affinnative ly appears from
the evidence that Erma Rice did not ''p,rior to said hearing in the hallway outside of the court room in said court
house'' meet petitioner and his wife. His wife testified
that she was not present on that occasion and was not
at the court house when the petition for distribution
was heard (Tr. 44-45). So that the aliegation that Erma
Rice made any statement ''to your p:et~tioner a;nd his
wife'' at the time the petition for distribution was heard
is utterly false. Austin Rice testified that he was not
at the court house at that hearing, and that the only time
he was at the court house was in the Sp~ringtime when
the will was offered for probate, at which time Erma
told hin1 everything would be taken care of, and there
was no use for him to stay, and so he went away (Tr.
98-100). Appellant's counsel endeavored to have the
1
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witness change his testimony, but was unsuccessful fTr.
100-101). Respondent testified that Austin was in the
court ro(om when the will was offered for probate (Tr.
230) which accords with Austin's testimony. In fact,
she invited him to be present (Tr. 230). Whether he
remained for the hearing, or went away is immaterial
because no eomp!laint is made of the will itself or of the
probate thereof. Resrpondent also testified that appellant was at the hearing of the petition fnr distribution
and remained until the proceedings were concluded. (Tr·
232); but she testified that she did not have any conversation with him on that occasion (Tr. 240-241). Therefore, if as Austin declares, the only time he was at the
court hous·e was iJn the Sp~ring when the will was offered
for ·probate, then at the time the decree of distributi~on
was entered, Erma did not say, and could not have said
anything to him as alleged in the complaint to induce his
absence or to pTevent him from having his day in court.
If on the other hand, he was present at the December
hearing as Erma testified (Tr. 232), then her testimony
that she had no conversati on with him, except to pass
the time of day, stands uncontradicted. In either event,
there is not a scintiHa of p~roof of any act of Erma's that
deprived Austin from having his day in court, so there
was, and could be no '' ext:rinsic'' fraud.
Therefore,
there is nothing in ·the evidence sustaining the allegations of the p~etition; therefore, no cause is shown for
upsetting a final decrHe after the e~p~iration of the time
for appeal.
The decree of distribution could only be attacked
1

1
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for fraud, and it must, as this court has declared, be ext.rinsic fraud, and such declaration is in accord with all
the Utah cases on the subject.
In lreyant r. [Ttah Savim.gs & Trust C~o., 54 Utah 181,
this language is used :
··This court is co1nmitted to the doctrine contended for by counsel for appellant, namely, _!Pat
probate proceedings are in rem, and that where
the statutory notice has been given all who are
interested in the estate are hound by all orders
or decrees duly entered in a particular case, and
that, ordinarily, the only remedy is by direct appeal. Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac.
522, 37 L.R.A. ( N ."S.) 368. This court has also
held that judgments and decrees entered by courts
of competent jurisdiction, where jurisdiction of
the subject of the action and of the person has
been legally acquired, can only be assailed on direct appeal or in equity for ·extrinsic as contradistinguished from intrinsic fraud. Cantwell v.
Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., 47 Utah 150, 151
Pac. 986.
In Anderson v. State, 65 Utruh 512, 517, the court
~nnouneed the rules by which an equity court is limited
in setting aside judgments. In that case it was a~leged
in the complaint that "Cora Ray and her mother, Alice
Ray * * * conspired and confederated together to suppress and conceal'' certain facts. Says the court:
1

"In order to obtain a decree vacating a judgInent forma lly entered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties on
the ground of fraud, a court of equity is limited
by 1nany rules, more or less inflexible: First the
fraud relied on must be extrinsic, and not f;arud
1
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which oovuld have b~een app·rehended and met in
the tnval -of the cas1e w·hich resutted in the judgrn.ent c~omplaine.d of; second, it should appear to
the satisfaction of the equity tribunal that had
it 1~ot been for the fraud the judgment would no.t
have b~een rernd,e;red; third, the fraud, and the effect thereof, should he made to appear beyond a
reas1owable doubt; and, fourth, the ·party seeking
the relief must have been free from negligence
in the trial of the case in which the judgm·ent was
rende_red. To these ru'les may be added another,
recognized and enforced in most jurisdictions, including our own, that mere p-erjury, committed
in the trial of the case in which the judgment was
rendered, is not such fraud as will authorize the
court to vacate the judgm·ent. Cantwell v. Thatcher Bros· Banking Co., 47 Utah 150, 151 Pac. 986."
(Italics ours).

The court quotes with app·rnvwl this statement from
Dringer v. Erie Ry. ·Co., 42' N. J. Eq. 573, 8 Atl· 811:

''A court of equity may unquestionably annul a judgment or decree which has been obtained by fraud, hut, in order to justify such an
exercise of power, it must be made clearly to appear that the judgment or decree has no other
foundation than fraud; in other words, it must be
made to appear ·that if there had been wo· fraud,
there w~ould have been wo judg·mevn.t or de:eree. An
attempt to exercise a wider or more liberal jurisdiction, in cases of this class, would, it witl be
perceived, necessarily ·enlarg-e the jurisdiction of
courts of ·equity so as to make them, practically,
courts for the review of the judicial acts of other
tribunals, and not tribunals with just sufficient
power to redress frauds hy undoing what fraud
has done. * * * A simple statement of the ground
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upon 'vhich jurisdiction in such cases rests shows
that,. unless the decree assailed is shown to he
the sole and ·direct product Df the f'riamd charged
this court has no authority whatever either to annul or change it, for its jurisdiction is unalterably
limited to the simple undoing of what fraud has
done. It is therefore, clear that, if this decree
has any other foundation than the fraud here
charged, this court, even if convinced that the
decree is unjust according to the real right of the
case, cannot disturb it." (Italics ours).
See also Wri.ght v. C~onst,ruction C.o., 108 Utah 28,
where the court again declares that even if tihe judgment \vas procured by perjured testimony, equity \vill
not set aside the judgment for such "intrinsic" fraud.
A·pplying the rule in Anderson vs. Stat,e, supra, can
it be said that if all the testimony presented to this
Court had been before Judge Hendricks in a hearing on
objections duly made to the p·etition for distribution, he
W1ould have render-ed '0/YIJY different decree o:f distrribut~on? Has there been, in this case, proof of fraud beyond
a reas~onable doubt or -p·roof of any fraud~ Was a~pell
ant fr;ee from negligence in failing to object to the petition or in failing to appea~l ~ The record does not show
that respondent did one thing to pirevent him from doing
either. Counsel says she did not object to his using the
water in 1945 and 1946 and that such act lured him into
foregoing hi~s right to appeal. This is just plain nonsense because if it were true that respondent failed to
object to his use of the water in 1945, before the petition
for distribution was filed, that could have no possible
bearing upon whether or not he was negligent after the
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filing of the petition in not examining it, in not objecting to it, and in not appealing from it within three
months after December 26, 1945. As to his use of the
water in 1946, it appears that defendant did make objeetion, and whatever use he made of the water that year,
whether befor:e or after defendant objected, was after his
time for appeaJl had already expired (Mareh 26, 1946).
If there was any failure to disclose facts (which we
deny) it would have been "intrinsic" fraud. If the
petition for distribution had be·en contested, could not
Judge Hendricks have very well declined to accept appellant's version -of the evidence as to the use of the water~
And if such might well have been the attitude of the
court, it cannot now be said that there is even a probability, much less a certainty, that a different decree would
have been entered. Judge Cowley declined to agree with
appeltants contention with all the evidence before him.
Res·pondent testified that she had not heard her
father or the boys ever S'ay that Austin's land was entitled to any water from Davis Creek (Tr. 2'38), and
she had a personal knowledge with res1pect to the matter (Tr. 238). She honestly presented her petition for
distribution on the basis of her understanding that there
was no water right for Aus tin's land (Tr· 232), and she
acted in entire good fa,ith without any intention of deceiving the -court or Austin ( Tr. 232-3). Furthermore,
she carried out what she knew to he her father's instructions at the time the will was made in having decreed to Austin only the tract of land below the highway (Tr. 233-4). Her tes,timony of her father's declara1
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tion 'vas properly admitted. 69 C. J. 144, 148, 151;
f.t~orthrup v. Columbian Lumber Co., 186 Fed. 770; L·o~
max v. Shinn, (Ill.) 44 N. E. 495; and Fly.'l'lln v. Holmatn,
(Iowa) 94 N. W. 4±7. A reading of Erma's testimony
will clearly show that she is an honest, conscientious person, who "ranted always to do her duty as she understood it and the court so finds. There is n ot an intimation of any fraudulent conduct on her part.
1

INTRINSIC FRAUD
But notwithstanding this court held that app·ellant's
case n1ust be based on extrinsic fraud, ap·p·ellant contends that it does not at all matter whether ·defendant
"knowingly" or "wilfully" made any "misrepresenta.~vons which kep·t plaintiff from ·attendimg the. hearifng,
if she failed to call the court's attention ,to the fact that
there was a ten hour water right from _Wednesday night
at nine o'clock until Thursday morning at seven o'clock
of each week, ·and to also inform the court that ~plaintiff
occupied the barn land· He claims that withholding of
this information is of itself fraud, irre,sp·ective of defendant's good faith; that even if she made a mistake,
nevertheless, she w·as supp osed to know, and that in
presenting her petition and in obtaining the decree she
was guilty of fraud by reason of her fiduciary relation
to the plaintiff. Disregarding the theory of his case
limited as it is, by this court to extrinsic fraud, and entirely ignoring the only charge of fraud stated in his
complaint which saved him in this Cuurt from th·e general demurrer, he undertakes now to base his cas.e· -on
1
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mtrirnsic fraud, that is, the alleged suppression of facts;
the alleged erroneous rep~resentations in the petition for
distribution, and the procurement of the decree, and
he cites many cases. We have read the authorities cited
by counsel, and there is not in the case at bar any of the
elements, facts or conditions which form the basis for
any of said decisions. Let us refer to a number of them
as illustrative of all.
LG!Il!Yb v. Kip,p, (Wis.) 145 N. W. 183, which was an
action to restrain the enforcement of a judgment, the
trustee deliberately exhibited and persistently urged
upon the court a false financial statement omitting a
$20,000 item which should have been charged against
him, and which amount he had converted to his own use.
The court found that he ''palmed off on aH parties a
spurious, deceptive paper as a disclosure.'' A clear
case of fraudulent purpose- and intent not present in
the case at bar, and a case of intrinsic fraud.
In Bohler v. Bohler, (Cal.) 67 Pac. 282, a widow entered into a conspiracy with her son (not the son of her
husband) and falsely and fraudulently represented to
the court that the son was a child of the testator whereby
she deceived the court and defrauded the infant chiidren
of decedent. Here was active unconscionable intrinsic
fraud.
In Puritnton v. Dawson, (Cal.) 6:5 P'ac. (2d) 777, a
residuary heir, with knowledge of a pretermitted heir,
gave no notice of the proceeding to such heir and purposely and intentionally kept such information from the
court and secured a decree of all the. p-rop:erty to himself.
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There ""as the further element in the complaint to quote
the 'vords of the court:
~'More S})ecifically it is alleged that a corrupt agreement was entered into between Purinton, ~frs. Potter's son, and Schaffer, whereby
Schaffer agreed that if Purinton did not notify
respondent that her grandmother had died and
allowed the estate to be distributed according to
the terms of the 'vill that Schaffer would make
a will in his favor."
The case is one of ''extrinsic'' fraud in failing to give
notice to the heir, as well as active, corrupt and intentional wrongdoing·
In Kauffman v. McLaughlin, (O·kla.) 114 Pac. 929·,
a trustee,· notwithstanding plain provisions of the wi'll
giving plaintiff a one-fourth interest in certain land,
the proceeds of the sale of which were to be he'ld for
twenty-five years if plaintiff was not s·ooner found, purposely withheld from the court information res.pecting
the trust and secured a decree under a ~p,rovision of the
wj.ll which gave no authority for such an action and deprived plaintiff of her interest. Active, premeditated
intrinsic fraud.
In Olivwa v. Grave, (Cal.) 12·2 Pa:c. 565, the administratrix hrought suit against one known to-be mentally incompetent and intentionally concealed such fact
from th·e court and had a default judgment entered
against the incompetent. Probably extrinsic as well as
intrinsic fraud.
1

Mary Pickfot1d Co. v.

B~aylf}y

Brothers, (Cal.) 86
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Pac. (2d) 102, is not in point at a'll for that case was an
appeal from a judgment.
Morrrrow v. B·oneb'fiaker, ('Kan.) 11'5 Pac. (2d) 585,
appears to be an incorrect citation.
In Larnabee v. Tracy, ('Cal·) 126 Pac. (2d) 947, the
attorney, who was also ·executor, after repeatedly, in
writing, reeognizing the rights of plaintiff as an heir
of her deceased mother, deliberately represented to the
court that such interest had laps-ed and by such fraud
secured a decree eliminating the plaintiff. This same
case was again bef'Ore the court in 134 Pac. ('2d) 275,
where the court emph~sized the neglect of the attorneyexecutor to give p l,aintiff notice of his change of attitude wirth respect to plain tiff's rights as an heir. Extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.
In Benson v. Andersron, 10 Utah 135, the brother of
deeedent secured all of de-cedent's property, including
certain land where the widow of deeedent had been living for thirty years and who was an old Danish woman
who had a very poor understanding of the English language rand who was dependent wholly on others for information as to her rights. The court held that it was
obvious that the court had made such an error in disregarding the plain provisions of the statute that in
view of all the conditions, equity should protect the old
lady from such a manifest injustice, hut the court remarked:
1

"We do not intend to declare that a party to
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gently pern1it the time for appeal to expire and
depend on a bill in equity to correct it.''
Of course, 've con tend the decree in this case is not
erroneous, but plaintiff had the right and the opp·ortunity to question the decree by appeal. He had no:tice
of the hearing for distribution and he neither ·examined
the petition before the hearing nor objected at the helaring; nor did he appeal.
All the cases cited hy counsel show deliberate bad
faith and intentional fraud. In most of them, the fraud
was "intrinsic." In further support of his contention
that it is immaterial whether the fraud he claims was
practiced, was ·'extrinsic'' or ''intrinsic,'' he quotes
from Judge Rutlege in Ea.rl v. Picken, 113 F·ed. (2d) 150.
(See Appellant's Brief pp. 86, 87). The rule_ announced
by Judge Rutledge, even in a case where a fiduciary
relation exists, that it is immaterial whether the fraud
be ''extrinsic'' or ''intrinsic,'' is not the rule in this state
as we have demonstrated by the Utah cases we have
heretofore cited.
Mere fai lure of the res-p·ondent (if there was a failure, which we deny) to call the attention of the court
to what he claims was the water right to the twenty-seven
acres, would not have constituted such fraud as to justify
setting aside the decree, and the mere fact th~t sh·e occupied a fidud~ary relation does not lend any support to
such contention.
In C~aldwell v. Taylor, (Cal) 23 Pae· (2d) 758, the
court declares :
/

1
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ject of what fraud will warrant the aid of equity
indicates that only upon proof of extrinsic or collateral fraud can plaintiff seek and secure equitable relief from the judgment. A showing of
fraud practiced in the trial of the original action
will not suffice. The authorities hold this to be
intrinsic fraud and uniformly hold that since there
must be an end to 'litigation and the fraud was
:part of the case presented in the former action,
equity will not reopen the litigation.''
And the court quotes from U. S. v. Throckmor~on, 98
U. S. 61, 65, 25 L. Ed. 93.
In Da,vis v. Seavy, (Wash.) 163 Pac. 3-5, the exeCU.tor
was charged in the complaint with having sup1p1ress;ed a
co·dici,Z to the will, and in failing to cal'! it to the court's
attention and in having distribution made to herself of
all the estate as provided in the will. Says the court:
''The only allegation of the complaint which
in any way suggests fraud on the part of respondent is that she, as executrix, came into possession of the property and papers of the deceased, including the alleged codicil, and that she
did not make lmown to the court the existence
of the codicil in the course of the administration
of the estate. This in no event could amount to
anything more than an allegation that respondent
did not present to the court upon the final distribution hearing the true facts touching the question of who is entitled to the property as distributee. In other words, this is nothing more than
an effort to avoid the deeree of distribution as a
final adjudication because of the presenting of
fa:lse :proof touching the merits of the question
of who is entitled to the property of the estate as
distributee. This is not groud for setting aside
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a final decree rendered upon due notice as this
decree of distri'bution \Vas rendered. In Meeker
v. Waddle, 83 Wash. 628, 145 P'ac. 967, a similar
situation 'vas presented in that the only ground of
fraud alleged or attempted to he proven 'vas that
the distributee falsely rep,resented that the land
in controversy was the community property of
hin1self and his deceased wife, whereas in truth
it was her separate property. Holding that this
was not ground for avoiding the decree of distribution, Judge Holcomb, speaking for the court,
observed:
'' ·If decrees 'vere to be set aside upon the
1nere ground that they were based upon perjured
testimony, decrees might never become final, for
the decree ,,~hich held that a former dec:vee was
founded upon perjured testimony might itself
later he attacked upon the ground that it was procured by perjured testimony, and so on ad infinitum·' Friedman v. l\fanley, 21 Wash. 675, 59 Pac.
490; ~IcDougaJll v. Walling, 21 Wash. 478, 58 Pac-.
669, 7'5 Am. St. Rep. 849.
''The decisions of the courts are substantially
unanimous in support of this view. We have
noticed that appellant was not prevented from appearing and s·etting up her claim during the course
of the administration of the estate, nor upon the
final distribution hearing nor ·induced to refrain
from so doing, by any word or act of respondent.
These are the m~atters to which alleged fraud must
reZate in order to be a~vailabLe in av10iditng the fiwal
effect of ,a d,ecree rend.ered upon due wotice. We
conclude that there was no cause for disturbing
the decree on the ground of fraud.'' (Italics ours).
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DECREE CONCL·USIVE CONSTRUCTION
OF WILL

'

The principle of law is well established that where
a court has entered a decree which involves the distrihution of property under a will, in the absence of appea~l
that decree is ~a final c:onsbruct~on of the will and that
eonstruction must stand in the :absence of appeal. In
Goode v. M~ontgomery, ('Cal.) 51 Pac. 682, tlhe court
declares:
"If the plaintiffs herein had felt that the decree of distribution was erroneous or defective
in not giving to them the powers which, in their
opinion, the te·rms of the will authorized to be
conferred upon them, they could have appealed
therefrom, and had the decree corrected; but,
·hy their failure to appeal, the decree has become
conclusive upon them, and they can no longer
con tend for a different construction than such
as its terms in1port. (Citing cas-es).''
Again:
''This distribution of the property, 'in lieu
and in full satisfaction of the legacy of one million dollars,' must he regarded as a construction
by the court of the testator's intention in creating
the trust, ·and is to be treialed .as if he h~ad cre,ated
the trust in the terms used in the aecree." (Italics
ours).
In re Keet 's Estate (Cal.), 91 Pac. ( 2) 944, it is
held that a decr·ee of distribution to heirs an'd to a
trustee is final and conclusive upon all parties and is
the measure of the rlights of all claimants under the wil'l;
that it is a judicial oonstruction of the will and is to be
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treated as if the testator had created the trust in the
terms of the decree·
Oounsel is so pressed in his attempt to impute fraud
to the defendant that he remarks:
''It is quite significant in this ·case that de~
fendant in the faee of all the evidence now known
to her is still insisting on keep·ing Aus'tin's p·rop·erty, and that she has even gone to the lengths
of saying that even if she was wrong, she still
is entitled to keep it, and there is no court that
can take away from her this ill-gotten prope;rty.
She still refuses to make any effort to fulfill her
fiduciary obligations, but is insisting with ·every
means at her command, that she keep Austin fTom
getting what his father willed him· She and her
witnesses made no attempt to aid the court. Their
whole effort ·even now is to withhold from the
court the true facts." (App. Br. p. 92).
Counsel allows his bitterness to guide his pen. His
statem·ent is tantamount to saying that because respondent does not accept as true the statements of Austin,
she is still acting fraudulently because she insists on
carrying out her understanding of her fiduciary obTigations and the express·ed direction of her fath·er when
the will was prepared. Her undeTstanding of her duty
is supported by the testimony of her brothers and other
witnesses. Couns·e l's concluding statement that the whole
effort ''even now is to withhold from the court the true
facts" is both unfair and untrue.
Considering the situation of the p~arties, why ·should
defendant have any desire to injure or defr~aud her
brother' Is it to he inferred that f or the interest in
1

1
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the estate which she will eventually receive, upon the
death of her mother, she is so selfish and avaricious as
to wish to keep him from receiving what his father intended him to have~ Her demeanor and statements on
the witness stand impressed the court and would impress
any reasonable person that all her acts in this matter
were based upon her honest he'lief and understanding
that her father intended Austin to have the land west
of the highway and that there was no water right from
Davis Cr;eek appurtenant to such land. Neither she, nor
any of her witnesses, have indicated uny inclination to
withhold facts. The statement of counsel is p·reposterous.
No Right to aeti:ef Without Proving Fraud

At page fifty-five of his brief, couns-e'J states:
"The question of what water Austin is entitled to may be determined without anyref.erence
whatever to the question of fraud. The decree
of distribution transferred the appurtenant water
to him and the only problem with reference to the
water is to determine what water was appurtenant to the decreed land. That water already has
passed to Austin under the decree of distribution.
It is not necessary to consider the question of
fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the
defendant with reference to the water.
As fast as counsel discovers that he cannot maintain his position on one theory, he resorts to another.
This court restrieted appellant's cause of action to extrinsic fraud on the part of the respondent in keeping
appellant from having his day in court. It was the allegation that by her statement to him in the hallway of
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the courthouse at Far:t:nington that he need not reinain
at the hearing 'vhich caused hin1 to abs-ent himself, that
induced this court to reverse the trial court's ruling on
the general demurrer. However, as we have shown, there
is no proof to support such allegation. N·ext counsel
shifts to the theory of intrinsic fraud in th'at respondent
did not represent the true state of facts to the court, and
because she acted in a fiduciary capacity such conduct
entitles appellant to have the decr·ee amended (See App.
Br. 76-90). "\Ve have already referred to the cases he
cites, some of which (~ontrary to the rule in this state)
seem to hold that a decree may be set aside for intrinsic
fraud. On both these theories, counsel takes the pos,ition
that the water right he claims is not included in the
decree of distribution, for he alleges that ap·pellant
"did not know until shortly before the filing
of this petition that the said Erma Rice had not
accurately represented to the court the p·roper description of the farm occupied by your petitioner,
and did not know until shortly before the filing
of this petition that the water us·ed on and appurtenant to the farm was not included in the
decree of distribution.'' (Rec. 78).
Knowing full well that if this court adheres to the
rule announced in W eyarnt v. Utah S~avings & Trust
Contpany, Anderson v. St~at·e, Wright Construction Q,omr
p,any, supra, and other decisions of this court, his claim
of intrinsic fraud practiced by respondent furnishes no
ground for relief, our nimble friend now says in the
forego'ing quotation from his brief that it is not necessary that he show any fraud, extrinsic or intrinsic

'
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because the decree carried the water which was appurtenant to the Austin Rice tract. In other words he claims
that Austin :acquired by the decree what Erma deprived
him of by not putting it in the decree; that she practiced
fraud by withho lding from the court information that
the water right went with the land and thereby induced
the court to leave the, water right out of the decree,
which in fact, the decree gives him; that he has vested
in h'im by the decree what was not included in the decree,
and that this court should amend the de-cree to give him
what the decree does not give him, but which it does
give hi~m. This cobwebby double-talk of co:uns·el excites
our :admiration, but suggests no reason why the decree
of distribution should, or can he amended when under
the rule, so well established that extrinsic fraud only
can furnish a basis for an attack upon it when no appeal
was taken.
1

If, upon any theory, it can he said that under the
pleadings in this case, :and the fiormer ruling of this
court, the trial court was not limited to the one question
of whether there was ·extrinsic fraud justifying an attack
upon the decree of distribution, and that the court had
the ri·ght, independently of the question of fraud, to
adjudicate between the parties their respective rights
to the waters of Davis Creek and to amend the decree
accordingly, nevertheless, under the -evidence 'in this
· case, there would be no justification for awarding appellant any water right as appurtenant to his land. The
m·ere fact that counsel contends that in the de·ed of this
land to David L. Rice water rights are mentioned does
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not signify that there was any water right ap~purtenant
to this land at the tin1e of nir. Rice's death. The evidence
clearly sho,Ys, and the court so finds:
''that for more than thirty years prior to,
and at the time of the death of David L. Rice, certain tracts of his lands 'vere surpplied with water
and irrigated from Davis Creek in Davis County·,
Utah;
****
That said David L. Rice during said p~eriod
irrigated from sixty to seventy acres of orchard,
grain, hay and other crops located north of Davis
Creek by means of what is known as North Ditch
extending from Davis Creek, and after about th·e
year 1919, did not use any water during his thirtytwo hour turn, through the White Ditch which
extends from South Davis Creek, and is the only
ditch through which said twenty-seven acre tract
could he supplied with water, hut the court finds
that after the said Austic Rice took up his residence on the twenty-seven acre tract in the Fall
of 1937, at times during the freshet season and
occasionally when 'vater was on turns, he used
some water through said White Ditch, presumably with his father's permission, for the irrigation of approximately eight acres of orchard and
garden, a part of said twenty-seven acre tract. ''
(Rec. 123-124) .
Now, if David L. Rice did originally acquire any
water right with the twenty-seven acre tract at the time
he pur'chased it, he certainly transferred that water to his
lands to the north and used it on said lands as testified
to by h'is sons -and other witnesses, and abandoned its
use on the Austin Rice tract. Certainly he had a. right,
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if he ever had any water with that land, to transfer
such water right to the lands to the north of Davis Creek.
Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 3'57; Arnold v. Reservoi.r Company, 64 Utah 534.
CROSS-APPEAL
Assignment of E.rror
The court erred in holding and deciding:
'' Th.at by ·reason of the facts found in paragraph 8 hereof, the proportion of said thirty-two
hour period which is ap,purtenant to the said eight
acres of the Austin Rice farm was, and is four
hours, that is to say, from one o 'elock A.M. until
five o'clock A·M. Thursday morning of each week;
(Finding 9, Rec. 124).
the said finding being contrary to and not supported by
the evidence.
(''The facts found in paragraph 8'' above referred
to are those set out in the last few lines of the above
quotation shown at page 31 hereof).
On the cross appeal, we need say no more in support of the foregoing assignment than that the court
erred in decreeing appellant four hours of water when
there is no evidence whatever, from either plaintiff's or
defendant's witnesses, to justify the eourt in awarding
appellant four hours. Furthermore, it is our contention
appellant is entitled to no water right wha tev~r fron1
Davis Creek; that the decree of distribution omitting
the award to appellant of· any water right is a binding
and conclusive interpretation of the will; and finally
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that no fraud has been shown to justify a court of equity
in upsetting said final decree.
Respe·ctfully submitted,
JES1SE R. S. BUDGE

.Atvorney for Respovniie'fl)t and
C ~oss-App.elZant.
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